Government Regulation of Foreign Direct

Investment Inflow and Sustainable Development

in Sub-Saharan Africa by Okposin, Samuel B. & Amalu, Adebola Temitope
International Conference on African Development Issues (CU-ICADI) 2015: Social and Economic Models for Development Track 
Government Regulation of Foreign Direct 
Investment Inflow and Sustainable Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Okposin, Samuel Bassey, Amalu Adebola Temitope 





Abstract- The pm·pose of this pape1· is two-fold: Fii·stly, 
to examine Sub-Saham Afdca's (SSA) competitive 
advantage as the least 1·ecipient of 1·egional Fm·eign Dii·ect 
Investment (FDI). Secondly, to investigate the possibility of 
unified Govemment Regulations to exploit SSA 
competiveness. It is a1·gued that the1·e is a stmng 
con·elation between SSA's competitiveness and FDI on the 
one hand and Gove1·nment Regulations to enhance the 
1·egional competitive advantage on the other. Using 
Dynamic Panel Analysis (1970-2013), 1·esults obtained 1·eveal 
occun-ence of p1·edatm·y FDI encoumged by SSA's lack of 
competitive advantage. The conclusion establishes the need 
fm· an SSA Investment Boa1·d, a development of collective 
SSA investment policies, as well as 1·egional investment 
zones fo1· sustainable gmwth and development. 
Index Terms- Gove1·nance, Fm·eign Investment, 
Sustainable Development. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There have been at least three notable global waves of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) over the last 70 years. The first 
wave, which began shortly after the Second World War, 
was mainly by American TNCs, who were drawn to 
Europe by the higher rate of return. The second wave 
began in the 1960s by TNCs from developed countries to 
predominantly the Newly Industrializing Economies 
(NIEs) in Asia because of government incentives, new 
markets and cheap labour. The third wave began in the 
1980s by TNCs from NIEs seeking a new location for 
cheap labour. The flow ofFDI from the NIEs is not only 
a testament to the fact that investment is fundamental to 
economic growth and development, but also that 
recipients of FDI can evolve to become foreign investors. 
However, in all three waves, Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) 
has been the lowest recipient of FDI and the least to 
benefit in sustainable development. 
Many studies have been carried out to address why 
SSA has been the lowest recipient of FDI. The findings 
from these studies have shown corruption [ 4 ], [28] , 
negative perceptions [28] , political instability [7] , [8] , 
institutional issues [ 11 ], [31 ], exchange rate volatility 
[24] , problematic market size [12] and lack of 
infrastructure [18] to be the key reasons. While the 
conclusions of these studies are accurate, what makes this 
paper unique and different from previous studies is its 
discussion and analysis of the following; firstly, to 
examine SSA's lack of competitive advantage to being 
the preferred FDI location; and secondly, to investigate 
the vital role of unified Government Regulations in the 
region needed to exploit SSA's competiveness. It is 
argued that there is a strong correlation between SSA's 
competitiveness and FDI and the role of the Government 
to initiate regulations that harness the existing 
competitive advantage and enhance complimentary 
factors that exist between the SSA countries. 
Since this is the 2nd Covenant University -
International Conference on African Development Issues 
(ICADI 2015), the conclusion of this paper makes three 
policy recommendations to enable SSA to become more 
investment friendly. The first policy recommendation is 
the establishment of SSA's Investment Board. The 
primary role of the Board will be to act as the investment 
"one-stop-shop" for the SSA region. The second 
recommendation is a call for the SSA governments to 
harmonize their investment policies and the third, to hold 
annual investment meetings with the sole purpose of 
removing any contradictions. The paper is divided into 
eight sections, with the next section examining the 
theories of FDI. The third section looks at previous 
empirical findings of the subject matter, while the fourth 
deals with the extent of FDI in SSA. The fifth and sixth 
sections outline the data methodology and utilize a fixed 
effect model of panel data, for observations from 1970 to 
2013 to determine the effect of government regulations 
and competitiveness on the attraction of FDI inflow into 
SSA. Sections seven analyses the results from the panel 
data and section eight concludes with policy 
recommendations. 
II. THEORIES OF FDI 
There have also been at least three corresponding 
bodies of literature to explain the global waves of FDI 
since the end of the Second World War. The first theory 
is the neoclassical capital arbitrage, which until 1960s 
was the only established explanation of foreign 
investment. According to this theory, it is the interest rate 
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difference between countries that causes the flow of FDI 
across national borders [13], [19], [20]. The second 
theory, which was particularly popular in the 70s, is the 
claim that the possession of firm specific "monopolistic 
advantages" or "intangible assets" is sine qua non for 
firm's overseas production. The monopolistic advantages 
may be in the form of production technologies, 
managerial skills, industrial organisation, knowledge of 
product, and factor markets [1] , [2] , [14], [15], [16], [17], 
[25], [32], [33]. 
The third theory which was an attempt to explain 
outward direct investment from Japan [21], [22], [23], 
[29], [30], in the 80s and subsequently modified in the 
90s to accommodate the uniqueness of Singapore and 
other NIEs, claim that FDI responds to changes in 
comparative advantage [27]. That is, firms in labor-
intensive industries, which are losing comparative 
advantage, will invest in countries that are gaining 
comparative advantage in that industry. 
The common theme in all three bodies of literature is 
that there is a correlation between the competitive nature 
of factors of production and FDI. In other words, in an 
increasingly integrated economy where at a micro level 
low transport and coordination costs allow firms 
substantial choice over where they locate, the notion of 
place-based competitiveness is important. If there were 
no competition the process of attracting FDI would be 
different; however, since competition exists, then it 
follows that at a macro level, governments have a role to 
play in shaping it. By way of simple analogy, all 
graduates seeking employment have what is known as 
"general skills" by virtue of formal training. However, 
when applying for specific roles, the general skills have 
to be exploited as core skills and competences to reflect 
the role. Similarly, as countries compete for FDI, 
governments have the specific role through investment 
friendly policies to shape both firm and national level 
competitiveness. 
Indeed, competitiveness then characterizes the set of 
institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level 
of productivity of a country. The level of productivity, in 
tum, sets the level of prosperity that can be reached by an 
economy. The productivity level also determines the rates 
of return obtained by investments in an economy, which 
in tum are the fundamental drivers of its growth rate. In 
other words, a more competitive economy is one that is 
likely to grow faster over time [35]. All countries and 
regions are endowed with certain advantages, which 
needs to be harnessed to compete for FDI. This is 
probably one of the "missing links" to SSA's inability to 
attract a greater level ofFDI. 
Ill. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In line with the above-mentioned theories are several 
empirical studies carried out to evidentially support the 
FDI flows to SSA countries. One of the early studies was 
the work of Agodo [3] , who strongly supports the 
argument for rate of returns as a motive for United States 
(U.S.) manufacturing investment in Africa. The study, 
which involved 33 U.S. firms having 46 manufacturing 
investments in 20 SSA countries, argued that there was a 
strong correlation between U.S. FDI in SSA and the 
expected premium. Accordingly, four main factors 
explain why U.S. firms' managers sought for a higher 
rate of return. Firstly, the move to Africa entails new 
risks and problems beyond what the U.S. investor would 
ordinarily encounter in the domestic market. Secondly, 
the higher rate of return in Africa was thus intended to 
compensate for the new risks and problems and its size 
was determined by, and varied in accordance with, the 
risk factor and other pertinent circumstances confronting 
the U.S. investor in the host country. Thirdly, the 
expected premium was intended to provide a sound 
independent basis for the long-term growth of the new 
venture without continued financial reliance on the parent 
firm. Finally, the expected premium also provided a 
modest reward for the parent's invested capital [26]. 
The outcome of Agodo's [3] research has been 
contradicted by Asiedu [5], who used panel-data to 
analyze 34 SSA countries between 1980 and 2000. The 
result showed that while high return on investment 
increased FDI to other developing countries, the same 
correlation was not true for SSA countries. In other 
words, there was no direct evidence to support the case 
for rate of return and FDI in SSA. This outcome supports 
the argument that profitability alone is not sufficient as a 
magnet of FDI. In a later research publication Asiedu [7] 
employed panel data for 22 SSA countries over the 
period 1984 to 2000 and argued that large local markets, 
natural resource endowments, good infrastructure, low 
inflation, an efficient legal system and a good investment 
framework promoted FDI and were some of the factors 
found to be significant in attracting FDI in SSA. For 
SSA to compete for FDI it is not enough to improve the 
policy environment alone but it must be supported by 
strong government actions [8], [10]. Finally, Asiedu and 
Gyimah-Brempong [9] demonstrated that SSA countries 
with improved institutions and policy environment would 
attract FDI. 
As a way of identifying profitable and non-profitable 
markets in SSA, Beraho [12] used the Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG) type matrix. The BCG matrix identified 
four markets among the 36 SSA countries. The first 
quadrant represents countries with a substantial market 
that is large enough to attract FDI. The second quadrant 
represents countries that are problematic but have 
reasonable potential for growth. Optimism in these 
countries is based on large markets, however they are 
severely handicapped by corruption. The third quadrant 
represents countries that are clearly in bad shape and are 
regarded as risky markets. The final quadrant represents 
countries that have the worst of both worlds; small and 
non-attractive markets, so investors would tend to avoid 
them. 
Summing up the empirical findings, the following 
two points are evident. Firstly, it is not a single factor but 
a combination of factors that motivate TNCs to pursue 
specific investments in SSA. This is particularly evident 
in the work of Asiedu and Gyimah-Brempong [9] where 
factors such as good infrastructure, natural resource 
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endowment and an enabling investment environment are 
found to be particularly important to foreign investors. 
Secondly, that rate of returns and market size competitive 
advantage in itself is not enough to attract FDI. 
Based on the current literature and the empirical 
evidence, there is a need to adopt a new approach to FDI 
in SSA as the current system is failing to attract foreign 
investors to the degree needed for sustainable growth and 
development. While progress has been made in 
institutional reforms, all SSA countries need to look 
beyond their national policies to FDI. Subsequently, a 
common and consorted approach in gaining the attention 
of foreign investors is necessary. In order to implement 
such an approach, governments in the SSA region need to 
understand that they have a role to play in shaping the 
competitiveness of the region. This is where this study 
advocates for an investment board for the SSA region. 
IV. STYLIZED FACTS ON FDI IN SSA 
SSA's attractiveness and economic performance since 
the 90s has been relatively poor in comparison with Latin 
America and Asia, where FDI has played a major role in 
sustainable development. Nevertheless, SSA performance 
since 2002 has improved with real GDP growth rates 
moving from 4% (2002) to 6% (2006) and 10% 
(2014)[34]. 
Following this improvement, four notable trends have 
emerged as a characteristic of SSA's FDI. Firstly, both 
inflow and outflow volumes across the region have 
continued to increase. Table 1 below gives an overview 
of the global FDI trends across regions (2010-2012). This 
reflects a global increase in both FDI inflow and outflow 
following the financial crisis. Secondly, even though the 
financial crisis affected SSA's attractiveness by 75 
percent, the impact was felt beyond the SSA region [34]. 
Thirdly, the positive outcome of the fmancial crisis has 
led individual countries in SSA region to implement trade 
openness strategies, institutional changes and 
competitiveness among other reforms. Finally, while the 
regions remain the lowest recipient of FDI to developing 
nations, these reforms have reversed the effect of the 
financial crisis in which the region now enjoys the benefit 
of continuous increase in inflow and outflow FDI. 
TABLE I. TRENDS OF FDI ACROSS REGIONS (U.S. BILLION 
DOLLARS) 
Region FDI Inflow FDI Outflow 
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
World 1409 1652 1351 1505 1678 1391 
Africa 4 48 50 9 5 14 
Latin 190 249 244 119 105 103 America 
Asia 401 436 407 284 311 308 
Oceania 3 2 2 1 1 1 
Transition 75 96 87 62 73 55 
Developed 696 820 561 1030 1183 909 
Developing 637 735 703 413 422 426 
Source: UNCTAD (2013) 
Prior to independence from the 1950s through the 
1960s, most SSA countries operated a closed economy 
with trade relations primarily with their colonial 
affiliates. The right to political rule howbeit, led to 
limited international trade relations with other countries. 
The investment flow during this period was therefore 
heavily reliant upon its colonial affiliates. 
Even though these nations had achieved 
independence, they were still not ready to receive a large 
flow of FDI. This was due to low-level skills within the 
domestic labour force and institutional deficiency. This 
was a pattern that appeared to be common across the SSA 
region, rendering it unable to fully maximize its 
attractiveness to the second global wave of FDI to 
developing economies. However, in the 70s and 80s FDI 
inflow was hindered by the occurrence of coups d' etat, 
civil unrest, political instability and an import 
substitution strategy that was adopted by many of the 
countries in the region. 
Foreign Direct lnvestment(FDI) in Sub-Saharan Africa(SSA) 
1970 1980 1990 
Year 
2000 2010 
a. Source: Authors' Analysis ofWDI Data. (2015) 
Fig. 1. FDI trend in SSA (1970 -2013) 
In spite of the above-mentioned drawbacks, the trend 
ofFDI into SSA (figure 1) revealed two notable patterns. 
The period between 1970 - 1979 shows FDI inflow was 
relatively stable. The period from 1980 - 2014 indicates 
continuous increase in FDI inflow volume with sharp 
volatility between 2009 and 2010 reflecting the period of 
financial crisis. This trend became less volatile (however, 
still at an increasing return to scale) from 2010 to 2013. 
The resulting implication of the trend on the global 
scale was an increase in FDI volume between 1980 to 
1990 by US$153.6 billion, an increase of US$1,193.8 
billion was experienced between 1990 to 2000. The sharp 
volatility period of 2000 to 2009 was due to economic 
and financial crisis with notable reduction changes in 
2000 (US$1,401.5 billion), 2003 (US$565.7 billion) and 
2007 (US$2100.0 billion) [34]. The period 2010 to 2013 
however, witnessed an increasing rise in global FDI 
Inflow volumes till date. However, SSA percentage share 
of global FDI volume stood at a mere 0.3 percent (2011) 
to 3.1 percent (2010) [34]. 
The effect of the global financial crisis which 
momentarily halted the global FDI trends within other 
regions, clearly had minimal impact on the SSA region 
[34].However, the poor percentage attraction pattern of 
FDI Inflow to SSA was due to a prevalence of resource 
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seeking FDI into single mineral extractive industries. The 
extractive outputs were usually exported from the host 
economy with minimal productive processing carried out 
on them. Thus, while the nature FDI attraction on the 
global scale increased across other regions, during the 
third wave, the percentage into SSA again remained the 
lowest [34]. 
1970 




1-- fdii -- gdp 1 
2010 
a. Source: Authors' Analysis ofWDI Data. (2015) 
Fig. 2. GOP and FDI trend in SSA. (1970- 2013) 
The variance in the trends of growth between GDP 
and FDI inflow within SSA (figure 2) experienced an 
increasing rise in GDP figures, thus increasing the 
attractiveness to extractive industry foreign investment. 
The actual nature and volume of FDI inflow clearly 
reflects growth patterns consistent with FDI theory [34]. 
TABLE II. TREND OF FDI ACROSS SSA (PERCENTAGE OF 
GOP) 
Region 200 200 200 201 201 201 201 201 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 
SSA 22.5 22.6 23.6 22.7 22.2 23.3 23.7 23. 8 
WAEM 19.9 21.9 19.8 21.8 20.2 21.0 22.2 23. u 0 
CEMAC 22.8 21.9 30.0 28.8 27.8 28.9 29.4 29. 1 
EAC 23.3 23.1 23.5 25.0 27.0 27.5 27.8 28. 3 
ECOWA 24.9 22.7 27.6 24.4 21.7 22.1 23.4 24. s 2 
SADC 21.4 23.2 20.7 20.7 21.4 22.3 22.2 22. 4 
SACU 21.7 23.3 20.5 20.0 20.5 20.5 20.3 20. 3 
COMES 21.4 22.5 21.5 22.9 23.6 26.3 26.4 25. A 6 
CFA 21.3 21.9 24.8 25.3 24.0 24.9 25.8 26. 0 
MORI 22.3 23.5 22.7 24.4 25.4 27.3 27.4 27. 0 
Source: IMP (2013) 
The regional FDI inflow volumes within SSA, 
recorded an average of 20 percent of GDP. This occurred 
with the ECOW AS and W AEMU regions recording the 
highest and lowest values respectively [36]. 
Also, the prevalent trait of the SSA economies was 
their inadequate provision of basic infrastructure required 
to maximize the benefits of the recorded low volumes of 
FDI inflow. This situation clearly weakened the 
absorptive capacity of SSA economies in the translation 
of technological advancement transferred by foreign 
investment. This was needed to trigger the required 
output level within the domestic market given the trade 
openness regimes already in place within SSA countries 
[11]. This no doubt reveals the SSA region's position 
within the global trend of FDI inflow growth effect that 
has gradually continued to increase in other developing 
regions, due to the introduction host countries 
governmental regulation except in Africa [34]. 
V. DATAANDMETHODOLOGY 
Data for this study was obtained from the World 
Bank, World Development Indicators data set for 43 
years (1970 to 2013) for the SSA region. The list of 
variables at constant United States Dollars (USD) 
includes the dependent variable FDI inflow (FDII) and 
the following explanatory variable: Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), FDI Inflow of the pervious year 
(FDII1_1), Gross National Income (GNI), Export 
(EXPORT), Import (IMPORT), Trade Openness (OPEN) 
(as a proxy for Government Regulations), FDI Outflow 
(FDIO), Labour (LABOUR) and Population (POP) (as a 
proxy for Market Potential). The long term effect of 
Government regulation on the attraction of FDI inflow 
towards attaining sustained development within SSA was 
established in a Dynamic Panel Estimation Technique. 
The choice of this technique allows for the control for 
errors of fixed effect, omitted variable bias, panel bias 
and endogeneity using the system Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM) while also utilizing the lag of FDI 
within the regression. 
VI. MODEL 
Based on theory, we specified a model of 
determinants of FDI inflow, in other to establish the 
effect of Governmental regulation on FDI Inflow 
attraction into SSA as follows: 
(1) 
Xit represents the determinants of FDI inflow into 
the SSA region which was then further specified as 
follows: 
FDIIi1=<X0 +<X 1 dami1+~1caff +~Odkf +~Pbumloq I!-] I! I! 
+~4fMmloq +~RMmbk +~Scafl It It It 
+~TiABlro +~Umlm +cit (2) It It 
cit represents the error term. The model was 
analyzed in both a Linear Regression and Dynamic Panel 
Data Estimation as explained earlier using STATA 13 
Statistical Package. 
VII. RESULTS 
Both the Linear Regression and Dynamic Panel Data 
Estimations revealed that Import levels (IMPORT), Trade 
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Openness (OPEN), the presence of Outward FDI (FDIO) 
as well as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were strongly 
responsible for FDI Inflow attraction, while Gross 
National Income levels (GNI) and Export (EXPORT) 
volume were strongly significant in discouraging FDI 
Inflow into SSA countries. These results reflect an SSA 
economy that is conducive for short term foreign 
investment without the macro-economic framework to 
sustain cyclical growth over a long period. Investors 
would therefore opt to engage in production of finished 
goods considered to be within the relatively low-income 
budget of the domestic market. Another attractive 
alternative would be semi-finished goods and raw 
material production requiring short term time horizon, as 
well as relatively low fixed cost of production for the 
domestic market. 
Results from the Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
indicate that FDI attraction into SSA was positively 
influenced by rate of returns. Therefore, the rate of 
returns is a major determinant ofFDI in SSA. 
POP, on the other hand was observed not to be a 
significant determinant of FDI inflow in the respective 
estimations. This reveals that although the SSA economy 
possesses an attractive volume of potential market for 
foreign investors, however the region lacks fmancial 
capacity for effective demand for finished goods and 
services. Similarly, the relatively low minimum wage rate 
prevalent in the SSA economies as reported by the Gross 
National Income (GNI) level mirrors the low capacity for 
demand of finished goods. 
TABLE III. LINEAR REGRESSSION RESULTS 
Variables Linear Regression 
Coefficient T P>t 
GDP 0.0850472 2.99 0.007 
GNI -0.0824446 -2.79 0.010 
BOP 0.0059256 0.26 0.799 
EXP 
-0.0779443 -3.04 0.006 ORT 
IMP 0.080974 2.75 O.Oll ORT 
OPE 8467.048 5.57 0.000 N 
FDIO 732.0267 39.17 0.000 
LAB 0.083802 1.69 0.104 OUR 
POP -0.0351946 -1.87 0.074 
Somce. Authors Analys1s (2015) 
TABLE IV. DYNAMIC PANEL-DATA ESTIMATION 
Variables Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel-Data Estimation 
Coefficient z P>z 
FDII,_1 0.0465652 1.54 0.124 
GDP 0.0995102 3.04 0.002 
GNI -0.0995402 -2.90 0.004 
BOP 0.0194333 0.72 0.469 
Variables Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel-Data Estimation 
Coefficient z P>z 
EXP 
-0.0757698 -2.68 0.007 ORT 
IMP 0.0813524 2.51 0.012 ORT 
OPE 7386.701 4.07 0.000 N 
FDIO 735.218 35.52 0.000 
LAB 0.0368762 0.59 0.555 OUR 
POP -0.0182385 -0.78 0.438 
Source: Authors' Analys is. (2015) 
However, the Balance of Payment (BOP) and Labour 
Force (LABOUR) were non-determining factors of FDI 
inflow in the SSA region. This has a negative effect on 
capital-intensive FDI, as the majority of the economies in 
the region are attractive to labour-intensive industries. 
The disadvantage in this is that it hinders the region from 
benefitting from the spillover effect of technological 
transfer that is mostly associated with capital-intensive 
industries. This is because most of the countries in the 
region have employment as their major strategy. 
The attractiveness of trade openness strategies within 
SSA countries comes along with the negative feature of 
an unskilled labour force and a domestic market that is 
dependent on low-income levels. While this may be 
attractive to certain kinds ofTNCs, it leaves a vacuum for 
opportunities to train, educate and upgrade skill levels in 
the work force. 
Following this, markets in SSA remain 
underdeveloped, less attractive and mostly consumers of 
technology. Therefore markets in SSA will continue to be 
dependent on imported capital goods and less attractive 
for sustainable development. 
VIII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore we conclude that trade openness, 
institutional reforms and competitiveness are 
fundamental to attracting FDI into SSA. However, 
competition in itself is not sufficient in attracting FDI 
unless there is a regulated framework and a nnified policy 
to enhance the region's competitive advantage. As a 
result, this paper provides three policy recommendations 
that will enable the region to become investment friendly. 
Firstly, the need to establish the SSA investment board, 
entrusted with the responsibility of harnessing individual 
government investment policy in the region. 
Secondly, the investment board will clearly identify 
and map investment zones in the region with the sole 
purpose being to attract location-specific FDI and 
accordingly outline investment incentives and the 
economic uniqueness of each zone. For example, the 
West African countries exhibit potential for 
specialization in labor-intensive investment, while 
Southern Africa economies would best capitalize on the 
attraction of capital-intensive investment. East Africa, 
based on natural resource advantage would best be 
288 
International Conference on African Development Issues (CU-ICADI) 2015 : Social and Economic Models for Development Track 
focused on resource oriented foreign investment (which 
will also be shared with West Africa) with the objective 
of a gradual transition of both zones to the manufacturing 
sector. 
Thirdly, there should be an annual investment 
meeting of SSA leaders to regularly review and 
harmonize investment policies with the sole purpose of 
removing contradictions. This will have the advantage of 
helping SSA countries, especially the smaller economies 
in attracting FDI opportunities that are unique and having 
the required competitive advantage. 
This recommended approach has not been seen 
previously but through its synergistic implementation, we 
believe that these three components can work together to 
harness the region's investment potential, making it more 
investment friendly. This will in tum raise the profile of 
the region both locally and internationally as a 
competitive market for FDI. 
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